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“We should have little confidence in the effectiveness of medical
interventions” (2018, p. 167). This rattling statement is the thesis that
Jacob Stegenga calls medical nihilism in his book of the same name.
Stegenga's monograph is a philosophical analysis and criticism of con-
temporary medical research that dissects the concepts, research
methods and social context of modern medicine. In building his case,
Stegenga exposes vulnerabilities in our concepts and methods that have
served as sites for various biases and interests to corrupt the evidence
base for medical therapies, especially drugs.
Stegenga's book is analytic, persuasive, eminently readable and
engages enthusiastically with the medical literature. It is a towering
contribution to philosophy of science and the burgeoning field of phi-
losophy of medicine. I trained in medicine as well as in philosophy. This
book speaks forcefully to both parts of me. Serious criticism of medicine
has often been left to other humanities disciplines. Important socio-
logical, anthropological and historical critiques of medicine have been
written, but no philosopher of science has wielded the tools of analytic
philosophy to launch a book-length critique quite like Stegenga does in
Medical Nihilism, which now belongs to a body of critical literature that
includes classics like Illich’s (1975) Medical Nemesis, Foucault's (1965)
Madness and Civilization, Wootton's (2007) Bad Medicine, and
McKeown's (1980) The Role of Medicine: Dream, Mirage, or Nemesis?
Compared to Illich, who was nihilistic about the entire medical
enterprise (“The medical establishment has become a major threat to
health” (Illich, 1975, p. 3)), Stegenga's ‘medical nihilism’ is a ther-
apeutic nihilism, challenging the effectiveness of contemporary medical
interventions. Should we accept his conclusion? Not quite, I argue. The
problem is that there is vagueness or imprecision in his central argu-
ment, which stands in the way of meaningfully interpreting and eval-
uating it. Moreover, the existing meta-research evidence on medicine
that might help make the terms in his argument more precise is not
constraining enough to render it interpretable and evaluable. Thus, we
cannot conclude that our confidence in the effectiveness of medical
interventions – even contemporary pharmaceuticals – ought to be ‘low’.
Nonetheless, Stegenga's book succeeds in arguing that we should be less
confident in the effectiveness of drugs than many of us are, which is a
significant achievement, and demands response both from philosophy
of science and from medicine.
Stegenga's claim is not the one that we should have low confidence
in all medical treatments: some interventions like insulin and anti-
biotics are ‘magic bullet's that work very well. Rather, we should have
low confidence in general, in most interventions. One could rightly
question whether Stegenga's nihilistic conclusion is the most helpful
one to draw given that it does not tell us how to more reliably assess our
confidence in interventions or indeed which interventions are magic
and which are muck (but as we will see in a moment, Stegenga's central
arguments do address these issues). However, here I scrutinize whether
his main conclusion is warranted by his arguments.
One could question the wide scope of Stegenga's therapeutic nihi-
lism. As a medical student, I was struck by the dizzying diversity of
medical interventions, from surgeries and vaccines to psychotherapy
and plain old medical counseling and advice. There is a diversity of
kinds of evidence to go along with this diversity of treatments, in-
cluding evidence from clinical experience, basic science and observa-
tional epidemiology (these kinds of evidence have their own problems).
As Broadbent (2019) points out, Stegenga's criticisms of medical re-
search best apply to pharmaceuticals studied in clinical trials. I agree,
but here I challenge Stegenga's conclusion even if we qualify it as a
narrower thesis about contemporary pharmaceuticals.
Stegenga uses Bayes’ Rule to organize his Master Argument for
medical nihilism:
=p(H|E) p(E|H) x p(H)
p(E)
H is a hypothesis claiming that a medical intervention is effective.
The evidence E is best understood as the apparent finding of a small
effect size in a clinical trial or meta-analysis of trials. The conclusion of
the Master Argument is that the probability of H given E, p(H|E), is
generally low: “on average we ought to have a low posterior probability
in that hypothesis, p(H|E) – in short, medical nihilism is compelling”
(Stegenga, 2018, p. 168). The chapter-level arguments of Stegenga's
book are meant to provide justification for thinking that the prior
probability of H (or p(H)) is ‘low’, the probability of E (or p(E)) is ‘high’,
and the probability of E given H (or p(E|H)) is ‘low’; and therefore, by
Bayes' Rule, p(H|E) is ‘low’.
p(H) is low because the pathophysiologic basis of most diseases is
complex (we should expect few interventions to be magic bullets that
fly right to the heart of the disease and target it successfully with few
side effects) and historically many medical interventions in use at some
point have later been rejected as ineffective. p(E) is high because of
widespread research bias: clinical trials and meta-analysis are malleable
and vested interests tune the methods to get a positive finding; thus, the
probability of finding a small positive result is high. Finally, p(E|H) is
low because most apparent effect sizes measured in trials are low (low
enough that we should actually attribute them to bias rather than any
effectiveness of the intervention) and because studies are frequently
discordant, contradicting each other – if most interventions were truly
effective, these findings would be uncommon.
There is vagueness or imprecision in Stegenga's conclusion that our
confidence in the effectiveness of medical interventions should be ‘low’.
What is meant by ‘low’? My quantitation of ‘low’ might overlap sub-
stantially with your quantitation of ‘high’ (a fact that has led the US
Intelligence Community to recommend the use of numbers in stating
the probability of politically relevant hypotheses (Tetlock & Gardner,
2015)). This problem makes the implications of Stegenga's conclusion
difficult to discern. Stegenga argues that “there can be no precise or
general answer” to how low is ‘low’, but: “It is enough to say: lower,
often much lower, than our confidence on average now appears to be”,
and he argues that our present confidence is high (p. 183). While the
suggestion that our present confidence is inflated is important, as
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Stegenga suggests it does not put a precise number to his medical ni-
hilism. Sometimes, a low confidence is enough to justify using a drug,
depending on what is to be gained or lost – it depends on how low is
‘low’.
However, I already said that I would not focus on how helpful his
thesis is, but rather whether it is warranted. The problem of imprecision
I want to explore further is vagueness in the other terms of Stegenga's
argument: p(H), p(E) and p(E|H). Stegenga writes, “I do not pretend
that the terms in the master argument can be precisely quantified, ei-
ther generally or for a particular medical intervention” (p. 178). Yet
imprecision makes it challenging to evaluate Stegenga's arguments for
each term. The fact that many medical interventions are eventually
rejected and that the pathophysiology of many diseases is complex does
not allow us to conclude that p(H) is low until we have a clear idea of
what ‘low’ means (and how common these phenomena are – the pa-
thophysiologic rationale for biologics such as monoclonal antibodies
may be stronger than the rationale for antidepressants or deep brain
stimulation). Even then it is challenging to draw a definite conclusion.
Moreover, imprecision makes it difficult to evaluate the overall
Master Argument. Stegenga notes that the Master Argument is valid
because it makes use of Bayes' Rule. But Bayes Rule is an equation, and
the conclusion of the Master Argument only follows validly if we choose
certain numerical values for ‘low’ and ‘high’. To illustrate, if by ‘low’
probability we mean 0.5 and by ‘high’ probability we mean 0.25, then
plugging in these numbers into Bayes' Rule we get a p(H|E) of 1.0,
which does not meet our definition of ‘low’. Though it might seem
strange to consider 0.25 to be high and 0.5 to be low, ‘high’ and ‘low’
are being applied to different types of phenomena, so it might be rea-
sonable to say that a 25% rate of bias among clinical studies is high
while a 50% prior confidence in the hypothesis is low.
Adding precision to the terms of the Master Argument would make
it more interpretable and evaluable. But then a tricky question presents:
what numerical values for the terms of the Master Argument are war-
ranted? Stegenga often discusses relevant evidence of wide trends in
medical research, including industry bias, publication bias and dis-
cordance among studies. As this kind of research is relevant to assessing
effectiveness, I have called it ‘meta-research evidence’ and argued that
it should be used in evaluating therapies (Fuller, 2018). Meta-research
evidence provides a promising avenue for providing quantitative con-
straints on the terms of the Master Argument and helping us better
assess just how confident in the effectiveness of medical interventions
we should be.1
Stegenga argues that the historical record of medical interventions
that were once accepted and later rejected as ineffective provides
support for a low prior probability of effectiveness, but adds that this
phenomenon lacks a quantitative analysis. Prasad et al. (2013) analyzed
all studies of medical practices published in the New England Journal of
Medicine in the first decade of the Twenty-First Century. Of 363 tests of
an existing standard medical practice, 146 (40%) found it worse than a
previous standard or than doing nothing (‘medical reversal’), 138 (38%)
confirmed the standard and 79 (22%) were inconclusive. In other
words, half of all conclusive tests were reversals, which might suggest
an estimate for the frequency of untested interventions that are effec-
tive of 0.5 – the prior probability of effectiveness before testing. How-
ever, this 0.5 may not provide a reasonable estimate for p(H) for many
reasons, including: the medical practices analyzed by Prasad et al. were
not exclusively treatments, tests are not always correct, and the sample
of practices studied might not be representative of all medical practices
(excluding, for instance, newer or experimental interventions).
Turning to the probability of the evidence given the hypothesis, p
(E|H), Stegenga notes that clinical trials and meta-analyses of the same
intervention often contradict one another. He cites meta-research by
Ioannidis (2005) showing that 14/34 (41%) of positive highly cited
therapeutic studies that were compared with a second study of the same
intervention were contradicted by the second study in terms of the
qualitative (20.5%) or quantitative (20.5%) treatment effect. There are
many meta-research studies of contradictions in the medical literature,
some of them involving large numbers of interventions in the Cochrane
database (e.g. Furukawa, Guyatt, & Griffith, 2002; Pereira, Horwitz, &
Ioannidis, 2012; Pereira & Ioannidis, 2011). However, none of these
studies pretend to include a representative sample of interventions, and
there are many possible explanations when two studies disagree, not all
of which suggest problems with the evidence (Fuller, 2018).
A further consideration Stegenga raises for determining the p(E|H)
is that many apparent therapeutic effect sizes are small. He cites some
examples of effect sizes listed on NNT.com. The number-needed-to-treat
(NNT) is a measure of effect size, the number of people one would need
to treat with the intervention to prevent or cause one outcome. I did a
bit of meta-research of my own, and found that of the 70 unique in-
terventions on NNT.com (most of them pharmaceuticals) deemed to be
effective with listed NNTs, 35 (50%) had an NNT greater than 10, and
53 (76%) had an NNT greater than 5 (The NNT Group, 2019). Un-
fortunately, it is difficult to discern the relevance of these data because
it is unclear how small an apparent effect size must be if we are to
plausibly attribute it to bias.2
Finally, in quantifying the rate of bias among therapeutic studies
and the probability of the evidence, p(E), several kinds of meta-research
that Stegenga discusses are relevant. For instance, a Cochrane review by
Lundh, Lexchin, Mintzes, Schroll, and Bero (2017) suggests that in-
dustry-funded drug and device studies are 1.27 times more likely to be
positive compared to non-industry-funded studies. Much of Stegenga's
analysis of medical research provides a convincing reason to believe
that this association is due to bias (‘industry bias’). Thus, we could
estimate that the results of at least 27 of every 127 (21%) positive in-
dustry-funded trials are due to bias - that's 14% of all industry-funded
trials included in the review. Other meta-research evidence such as
evidence of widespread publication bias (Hopewell, Loudon, Clarke,
Oxman, & Dickersin, 2009) suggests that the probability of bias might
be higher than 14% but does not narrow the probability of bias on a
more precise value. Moreover, the probability of positive evidence E
depends on more than just the probability of bias.
In summary, the available meta-research evidence is not sufficient
for estimating numeric values for the terms of Stegenga's Master
Argument. On the other hand, the values he assigns to them (‘low’,
‘high’) are too imprecise to evaluate whether they are warranted and
whether they in turn warrant the conclusion, ‘medical nihilism’.
However, Stegenga's arguments do succeed in showing that we should
be less confident in the effectiveness of drugs than many of us are.
More meta-research could be useful for further constraining these
values and evaluating Stegenga's therapeutic nihilism. However, there
is a more urgent reason for wanting this kind of evidence: for the
purpose of re-evaluating individual therapies (Fuller, 2018), especially
considering the problems that Stegenga explores masterfully in his
book. Stegenga's rigorous defense of his position in Medical Nihilism
should temper any naïve medical optimism. To that end, it is an im-
portant antidote, even if the precise dose is difficult to titrate.
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